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The purpose of these two studies was to examine two factors that may influence
the effects of uncertainty on information processing. The first factor is the positioning of
uncertainty relative to a target of judgment, and how this affects people’s judgment
processing. The second factor had to do with the degree to which uncertainty signals
active goal conflict or not. In the first study, 145 participants with a mean age of 19.51
were induced with uncertainty either before or after information about the target accused
of illegal behavior. The results demonstrated that uncertainty before information
produced higher guilt judgments of the target and uncertainty after information produced
lower guilt judgments towards the target, but only in a subset of conditions. The second
study, with 121 participants and a mean age was 19.58, primed participants with one of
two different goals. It then induced uncertainty threat which either was or was not
relevant to the primed goal, and asked participants to make judgments based on
information given about the target as in Study 1. The results revealed that for women, but
not for men, uncertainty threat produced stronger guilt judgments when the uncertainty
was relevant to the primed goal. Together, these results indicate that both the positioning
and goal relevance of uncertainty may impact its effect on information processing.

vii

Introduction
People make countless decisions every day, all of which involve processing
information in order to develop a response. One particular concept included in
information processing is uncertainty, or the sense that one’s actual level of knowledge
does not match one’s desired level of knowledge. It is highly improbable that people will
know every detail that could be relevant in making a decision. It would seem that the less
one knows about the decision at hand, the more uncertainty is involved in processing and
developing a response. Regardless of the degree of one’s uncertainty, it can play at least
two different roles: as a threat, and as a source of information.
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Review of Study 1 Literature
Uncertainty as a Threat
When uncertainty is perceived as a threat, people typically take a defensive stance
and reinforce their personal beliefs. One particular area threat-induced uncertainty has a
notable influence in is stereotyping. Fein and Spencer (1997) looked at how uncertaintyrelated threat affects how people stereotype. Participants began the experiment by taking
an intelligence test, and were given bogus feedback on how they performed. The positive
feedback group was told they scored at the 93rd percentile and the negative feedback
group was told that they received a score at the 47th percentile, which presumably made
them uncertain about their intellectual ability. Then, participants were asked to assume
the role of personnel manager, and were given a file on an applicant for hire. Half of the
participants were given a file on an Italian applicant and the other half received a Jewish
applicant file (taking advantage of the locally present Jewish-American Princess (JAP)
stereotype). Fein and Spencer (1997) found the Jewish applicant was rated more
negatively by the negative feedback group than all other conditions. It would seem that
the negative feedback induced uncertainty in participants about their abilities, causing
them to use stereotypes. Stereotyping may have offered a way to reduce uncertaintyinduced anxiety by reinforcing the validity of participants’ stereotypic beliefs. This
occurred in spite of the fact that reliance on stereotypes biased judgments in this study.
Under some conditions, then, it appears that uncertainty can increase reliance on
stereotype information.
Uncertainty as a threat also plays a role in how people view contemporary social
issues. McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer (2001) looked at how personal
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uncertainty created by an uncertainty-inducing dilemma rumination task affected
people’s attitudes toward capital punishment and abortion. Participants were asked to
think and write about a complex dilemma that either affected their lives, or affected the
life of a friend. Then, participants answered questions about the pros and cons of the
dilemma, considering both the implications of the status quo remaining unchanged, and
the implications of different dilemma resolution attempts. Attitudes toward capital
punishment and abortion were assessed, followed by a measure of perceived attitudinal
consensus, which asked how much of the population the participant thought agreed with
his or her views. McGregor et al. (2001) found that participants assigned to the personal
dilemma condition had increased conviction in their attitudes towards capital punishment
and abortion, and reported higher levels of consensus with their views.
Another study on how uncertainty as a threat plays a role in information
processing is in the area of procedural fairness research, by Van den Bos, Poortvliet,
Maas, Miedama, and Van den Ham (2004). They wanted to observe how uncertainty
salience affected fairness concerns. Participants received either an uncertainty salience
task or a control task. Participants were then asked to read over a scenario in which they
imagined they would be applying for a job which required a selection process involving
nine distinct tests. Participants then were told to imagine that a week had passed since
taking the tests, and they would be evaluated by scores on all nine tests (fair condition) or
by only one test (unfair condition). Questions about anger towards the process and
manipulation checks were then answered. Van den Bos et al. (2004) found that
uncertainty salience increased participants’ anger in the unfair condition, relative to the
respective no uncertainty condition. This study suggests that uncertainty has strong ties to
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procedural fairness, meaning that uncertainty makes fairness a more significant concern
than it otherwise would be.
In sum, existing literature suggests that threat-induced uncertainty affects
numerous areas of life. It is involved in stereotyping situations, social issues such as
capital punishment and abortion, and how fairness is perceived. Uncertainty induced as a
threat typically causes people to have stronger opinions and reactions and appears to
cause people to become defensive in order to protect the self.
Uncertainty as a Source of Information
Although uncertainty can be perceived as threatening and cause defensive
responses, it also can play a less threatening role. Uncertainty can also play the role of a
source of information to inform judgments. This type of uncertainty can be thought of as
meta-cognition, or as thought about one’s own cognitive processes. Although uncertainty
threats have sometimes increased stereotyping (e.g. Fein & Spencer, 1997), stereotyping
research also shows how uncertainty as a meta-cognition can lead to decreased
stereotyping. Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, and Tobin (2001) conducted a study to examine
how uncertainty, measured by the Causal Uncertainty Scale (CUS), affected participants’
ability to make guilt judgments about a case of academic misconduct. The CUS measures
individual differences in causal uncertainty beliefs, which are beliefs about one’s abilities
to identify and understand cause-and-effect relationships. Participants in the Weary et al.
(2001) study were given a case file about a student accused of cheating on a math test.
Half of the participants read in the report that the student was an athlete while the other
half did not see any stereotype relevant information about the student listed in the report.
Then, participants answered a series of questions about the case file and student’s guilt,
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followed by the CUS and other scales. Weary et al. (2001) observed that participants with
low CUS scores showed stereotype effects, judging targets described as athletes to be
more likely be guilty. However, no stereotype effects were found for high CUS scoring
participants. Those with high CUS scores did not use the given social category
information to make a decision.
Uncertainty also can be induced through physical actions and subsequently serve
as information, in a seemingly meta-cognitive role. Briñol and Petty (2003) conducted an
experiment testing how confidence in one’s thoughts is affected by head movements.
Participants were asked to test the quality of headphones by nodding/shaking their heads
while listening to a fabricated radio station editorial. This head movement manipulation
was shown to cause either certainty or uncertainty, respectively (Briñol & Petty, 2003).
The editorial was an argument about students being required to carry personal
identification cards while on campus. The argument provided either several strong
reasons or several weak reasons as to why the college wanted to establish this policy.
Then, participants rated the quality of the headphones and completed several scales that
related to how favorable they were toward the issue of personal ID cards. Briñol and
Petty (2003) found that nodding created a more favorable opinion of ID cards in the
strong argument condition when compared to shaking, but shaking created a more
favorable opinion of ID cards in the weak argument condition compared to nodding.
Nodding increases confidence in whatever one’s thoughts are and shaking increases
doubt in the same. Thus, a strong argument creates positive thoughts which are acted on
by subsequently induced head movements related to confidence or doubt. A weak
argument causes negative thoughts, which also are affected by head movements.
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The influence of power on decision-making is another area in which uncertainty
as a source of information has been studied, and one which shows some of the seemingly
paradoxical effects that uncertainty can have. Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, and Becerra
(2007) conducted a study to see how varying levels of power would affect participants’
thought confidence after reading a new vaccination policy. Participants were first asked
to read over the policy, then to generate thoughts either in favor of or against the policy.
Then, participants completed one of two writing tasks that assigned them to the highpower condition or the low-power condition. Next, all participants were asked to answer
questions about the policy, which included questions that assessed attitudes toward the
policy. Briñol et al. (2007) found that compared to the low power condition participants,
the high power condition caused people who had generated thoughts in favor of the
policy to have more positive attitudes toward the policy, and those who had generated
thoughts against the policy had more negative attitudes toward the policy. In short, the
high power condition increased confidence in one’s thoughts, while the low power
condition increased uncertainty. One ironic consequence of this was that low power
caused people to trust their thoughts against the policy less, in essence negating the
negative thoughts they had generated.
Previous literature suggests that uncertainty as information, in a meta-cognitive
role, influences various aspects of life. It plays a role in stereotyping issues, thought
confidence, and moderates how power can affect decision making. Uncertainty as a
source of information usually causes people to have doubts about their own contents of
mind, or possibly to look elsewhere for more information in order to make a better
decision.
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Importance of Study 1
As shown, there are various areas of research in which the multifaceted function
of uncertainty becomes an important factor. However, we know little about how
uncertainty can be threatening in some cases, yet serve as a source of information in other
cases. Based on previous literature, it seems that uncertainty threat is active when the
induction task comes before information, as seen in the uncertainty threat induced by the
false feedback in Fein and Spencer (1997), the personal rumination task in McGregor et
al. (2001), and the uncertainty salience task in Van den Bos et al. (2004). However,
uncertainty threat does not seem to occur if the induction task is executed at some point
other than before information is given. This can be observed, for example, in the overt
uncertainty and confidence-related head movements completed in tandem with listening
to the pertinent information in Briñol and Petty’s (2003) study, and the confidencerelated power induction task completed after reading a vaccination policy in Briñol et
al.’s (2007) study. This study addressed this issue of how differences in the confidenceuncertainty dimension can cause such different outcomes by investigating how the
placement of uncertainty, relative to a judgment task, would impact responses. This idea
builds on the observation that uncertainty presented before some stimulus about which a
judgment is to be made seems reactively to increase confidence in those judgments. It
simultaneously builds on the observation that uncertainty presented after some stimulus
(but before the judgment task measurement) about which a judgment is to be made seems
to decrease confidence in judgments. In the former case, uncertainty seems to operate as a
threat. In the latter case, it appears to operate as a meta-cognition.
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In order to test the idea that the positioning of uncertainty would determine its
impact, uncertainty was induced either before or after participants were exposed to
information about which their judgments are sought. This study used a modified version
of the Weary et al. (2001) paradigm, which consisted of an athlete condition and a no
athlete condition. Uncertainty was introduced using a task similar to that used by
McGregor, Prentice, and Nash’s (2009). McGregor et al. (2009) asked participants to
respond to a prompt asking them to indicate what feelings and physical actions were
aroused by being “uncertain”. This task was used because it has been shown to be
effective, and it was easily positioned either before or after the Weary et al. (2001)
paradigm.
I predicted that the group that received the uncertainty salience task before the
relevant information, or the pre-target group, that was assigned to the athlete stereotype
condition, would make stereotype-consistent target judgments. I also predicted that the
post-target group, i.e. the group that viewed information before the uncertainty induction,
would show less stereotype consistent judgment. In other words, uncertainty induced
before information should encourage participants to rely more on their existing
knowledge base and increase stereotyping, while uncertainty presented after information
should act on that information in a meta-cognitive capacity, weakening whatever interim
guilt judgments were made. Post-target uncertainty groups should doubt the implications
of accessible stereotypes, and therefore should base their judgments more on the specific
details given in the description of the target.
Stereotypes should not only affect the content of judgments, however. Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) found that those who use stereotyping in making
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decisions generate quicker decisions that those who do not. Based on this, I predicted pretarget uncertainty groups should have used their pre-existing knowledge base to make
their judgments, which is quicker than searching for new information to make a
judgment, as the post-target groups needed to do (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Tiedens &
Linton, 2001; Weary et al., 2001). That is, the meta-cognitive impact of post-target
uncertainty should cause longer reaction times responding to questions on stereotype
relevant information when compared to pre-target uncertainty groups.
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Method
Participants
Participants in this study consisted of 145 undergraduate psychology students
attending Western Kentucky University. Human Subjects Review Board (HSRB)
approval was obtained for this project, and informed consent was given by participants
(See Appendix A for informed consent form). Participants either received extra credit or
course research credit for participating. Participants were recruited without regard to their
gender, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation. There were 43 male participants and 102
female participants, and the mean age was 19.51 with a standard deviation of 3.928.
Design
This study is considered to be a 2 (induction type) X 2(induction placement) X 2
(stereotype information) between-subjects factorial design. The induction types were
uncertainty and watching television (control). The placement was either before or after
the stereotype information in the experiment. The target in the stereotype information
was identified either as an athlete or given no description for the non-athlete condition.
Materials
The manipulations for the salience task consisted of two open-ended response
questions. This was a modification of the McGregor et al. (2009) uncertainty salience
task (See Appendix B for the materials used in this task). The first question asked
participants what emotions come to mind when they are either insecure/uncertain vs.
watching television. The second asked participants to explain what happens to them
physically when they are uncertain/watching television. After the task, filler questions
were asked in order to let the uncertainty salience take effect. These filler questions were
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needed in order for uncertainty to take effect properly (c.f. Wichman, Brunner, & Weary,
2008).
The target information included one of two stereotype descriptions. Both
stereotype conditions (either athlete or no athlete) contained a police statement and
personal statement made by the alleged offender. A mugshot-like image was presented
with the personal statement. A police statement was shown to make the information
appear to be official, as well as to provide a conflicting view of the student‘s personal
statement. The only difference between the stereotype conditions was that the target was
described as an athlete or not. A black-and-white image of college-aged, AfricanAmerican male was presented in both conditions (See Appendix C for these materials).
Following the salience task and stereotype information were the dependent
variable questions used to measure level of guilt judgments. These questions asked
participants to indicate on Likert scales how guilty the student was, how comfortable
participants would be with the student, etc. Higher dependent variable (DV) scores
indicate stronger guilt judgments (These items can be found in Appendix D).
Although my initial analyses focused only on the manipulated independent
variables, some individual differences also were measured in order to possibly control for
variance between conditions unrelated to the manipulations. The main scales that were
used in this study were the Need for Cognition Scale (Ncog; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982),
the Personal Need for Structure Scale (PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), and the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965).
The Ncog (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) scale was used to indicate a person’s
tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking. This measure has moderated the use of
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uncertainty as meta-cognition, as reported by Briñol, Petty, and Tormala (2004). Those
who score high on the Ncog scale typically process information in a more effortful
manner than those with low scores, and have been shown by to show larger metacognitive effects of doubt (Briñol et al., 2004). According to Cacioppo and Petty (1982),
the Cronbach’s alpha for the Ncog is .90, and the split-half reliability is .87. In the
current study, the Cronbach’s alpha for the Ncog scale was .73 (See Appendix E).
The PNS (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) assesses the preference for simplicity in
cognitive endeavors. Higher PNS scores typically correlate with stronger uncertainty
reactions. Should the PNS be needed in the analysis, it is possible that high PNS
individuals will use stereotypes more, as they are more likely to stereotype. The
Cronbach’s alpha is .77 (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). In the current study, the
Cronbach’s alpha for the PNS was .82 (See Appendix F).
The RSE (Rosenberg, 1965) was designed to assess high school student selfesteem, but has been used to test other populations (Ciarrochi & Bilich, 2006). People
with higher scores on the RSE typically show stronger threat responses (McGregor,
Gailliot, Vasquez, & Nash, 2007). Ciarrochi and Bilich (2006) report the Cronbach’s
alpha of the RSE to be .92, and a test-retest reliability of .87. In the current study, The
Cronbach’s Alpha for the RSE was .68 (See Appendix G).
These measures were to be used if the initial data-analytic approach did not work
out as planned. Ultimately, these measures were not helpful in obtaining the predicted
effects (all p’s > .05), although the PNS was related to participant outcomes. These PNS
findings are presented below, in the results section.
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Procedure
Up to eight participants took part in each experiment session. Participants were
each seated in front of a computer, which explained that the study involved how
personality and previous experiences play a role in how people perceive the world.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 8 different conditions formed by the 2
X 2 X 2 design. Demographic information was taken using the computer.
Participants either encountered the stereotype information or the salience task
first. These two items were counterbalanced across conditions. Next, participants
completed the Ncog, PNS, and RSE. Participants were given time to ask questions about
the study after completing the study, and were thanked for their time.
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Study 1 Results and Discussion
Dependent Measures
The main interest for this study was examining the effects of uncertainty threat
type, position of threat, and target type on the dependent variables. An initial MANOVA
analyzed position of threat, target type, and uncertainty threat as independent variables
and the target questions as dependent variables. A threat position X target type X threat
type analysis revealed two marginally significant effects of how confident participants
were in the guilt judgment they gave (F (1, 144) = 3.247, p = .074, η2 = .023) and how
powerful participants thought the evidence was against the target (F (1, 144) = 3.519,
p = .063, η2 = .025). Table 1 and 2 show the means and standard deviations for the two
marginally significant dependent variables.
Unexpectedly, participants in the before information position who received the
athlete target type produced less confidence in their guilt judgment when given the
uncertainty threat when compared to participants who were given the control condition.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Confidence of Guilt Judgment towards Target

Source
Confidence in
Guilt Judgment

Threat
Target
Position
Type
Before
Information Athlete

Threat
Type

No Athlete
After
Information Athlete
No Athlete

Std.
Mean Deviation

Uncertainty
Control
Uncertainty
Control

4.60
5.06
5.11
4.56

1.353
1.349
1.231
1.822

20
18
18
18

Uncertainty
Control
Uncertainty
Control

4.85
4.47
4.48
4.82

1.565
1.281
1.546
1.380

20
17
17
17

Participants in the before information position who received the no athlete
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N

condition produced more confidence in their guilt judgment when given the uncertainty
threat when compared to participants who were given the control condition as
anticipated. This finding is comparable to McGregor et al. (2001), as participants had
more confidence in their views when given an uncertainty-inducing personal rumination
task when compared to the control task.
The trends seen in the after information position groups are the opposite of those
seen in the before information position groups, but unfortunately so small as to be
difficult to interpret. Participants in the after information position groups who received
the athlete target type produced more confidence in their guilt judgments when given the
uncertainty threat when compared to the control condition. Participants who received the
no athlete target type produced less confidence in their guilt judgment when given
uncertainty threat when compared to the control condition. Although judgments about the
athlete were influenced in a direction opposite what was expected, this pattern of means
is consistent with the hypothesis, if one assumes that participants were uncertain about
the athlete’s guilt. Uncertainty about guilt, when operated on by subsequent uncertainty,
might increase confidence, making this trend consistent with a meta-cognitive
perspective. This finding is similar to Briñol and Petty’s (2003) uncertainty-inducing
head shaking conditions, where, the uncertainty induced by shaking one’s head gave
more confidence in weak arguments than did nodding. In this study, uncertainty about the
athlete’s guilt may have combined with situationally-induced uncertainty to create greater
confidence. In the no-athlete condition, where participants may have been more certain to
begin with, situationally-induced uncertainty lessened people’s certainty.
These statistics seem to indicate that the position of uncertainty does change how
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uncertainty affects the responses given, and suggest that uncertainty positioned before
information and uncertainty positioned after information may have opposite effects.
These trends may not be exclusive to guilt judgments, as can been seen in the result for
the next dependent variable.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Power of Evidence against Target

Source
Power of Evidence
Against Target

Threat
Position
Before
Information

Target
Type

Threat
Type

Athlete

Uncertainty
Control

4.00
4.33

1.777
2.000

20
18

Uncertainty
Control

4.72
4.50

1.602
2.149

18
18

Uncertainty
Control

4.85
4.06

1.843
1.088

20
17

Uncertainty
Control

2.76
3.65

1.562
1.998

17
17

No
Athlete
After
Information

Athlete
No
Athlete

Std.
Mean Deviation

N

The trends of the athlete conditions for the power of evidence against the target
question follow the same trends that were seen in the means for the confidence in guilt
judgment, but only the no-athlete conditions were consistent with hypotheses and
previous literature. Uncertainty before information produced higher ratings for the power
of evidence against the non-athlete target than the control condition, and uncertainty after
information produced lower ratings than the control condition. Although the pattern of
means was consistent with hypotheses, the mean differences between the uncertainty
before information and control before information groups (Mdiff = .22, d = 0.058), the
uncertainty before information and control after information groups (Mdiff = 1.07,
d = 0.283), and the uncertainty before information and uncertainty after information
16

groups (Mdiff = 1.96, d = 0.527), before information and control after information groups
(Mdiff = .85, d = 0.201), the control before information and uncertainty after information
groups (Mdiff = .22, d = 0.419) and the control after information and uncertainty after
information groups (Mdiff = .89, d = 0.240) were all insignificant (all Tukey HSD
p’s > .102).
Reaction Times
Reaction times (RTs) of the target questions were also analyzed using MANOVA.
There were no significant interactions, but main effects for the threat position
independent variable were found. RTs for the guilt of target (F (1, 144) = 5.589, p = .019,
η2= .039) and the power of evidence against the target (F (1, 144) = 9.790, p = .002,
η2 = .067) were significant when examining threat position, and both sets of RTs follow
my hypothesis. Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for the significant RTs
of the threat position independent variable.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of RTs for Threat Position (in seconds)
Source
Guilt of Target RTs
Power of Evidence RTs

Threat position
Before Information
After Information
Before Information
After Information

Mean Std. Deviation
4.091
2.161
4.922
2.445
6.279
2.393
8.558
5.957

N
74
71
74
71

Both sets of RTs in the table followed my hypothesis. The after information
means target question reaction times were slower than the before information
counterparts for both guilt of target and the power of evidence against the target.
PNS measures
In order to analyze the target questions using the PNS scale, the PNS score was
computed and correlated with the dependent variable questions. From this analysis, a
17

correlation was observed when correlating PNS scores with the guilt of target question,
r (144) = .210, p = .011, which indicates a weak positive relationship. This suggests that
the participants’ PNS scores can be used to predict how guilty participants believe the
target is, but are a weak predictor. The PNS did not interact with the independent
variables to predict target guilt judgments.
The pattern of means in the no-athlete conditions was as predicted, although the
athlete conditions were not. This may be because the athlete stereotype information may
not be as effective as previously thought, at least in the context of observing differences
in uncertainty due to placement.
The RT data, while consistent with the hypothesis, are not conclusive with respect
to the role of post-target uncertainty increasing processing time. A more parsimonious
explanation would be that any kind of distractor task after exposure to the target, but
before completing the judgment task, slows response time. Additional research is needed
to determine if uncertainty slows responses above and beyond the effects of a neutral
post-target delay task.
Limitations of Study 1
Even though my hypotheses were partially supported, the study design may not
have been maximally effective for an uncertainty placement study. Participants seemed to
perceive the athlete information in a different way than expected. One additional
possibility is that the uncertainty induction task was too general to threaten participants,
as it asked for the general physical and emotional aspects that accompany uncertainty.
The type of uncertainty induced was not necessarily personally relevant for participants.
Indeed, some authors (McGregor, Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008) have argued that unless
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uncertainty threatens active goals, it will not act as a threat. If the design could be
modified to get participants personally involved, and ruminate on a situation of
uncertainty from their own lives, relevant to their own goals, it might be more effective at
drawing out uncertainty-induced responses.
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Review of Literature for Study 2: Uncertainty as Goal-Conflict
The concept of uncertainty creating conflict with personally relevant goals has
been examined by recent publications in the field. One particular set of studies was
conducted by McGregor et al. (2008), who observed how two types of goal conflict
created by uncertainty affected the religious zeal of undergraduate psychology students.
Their first study had participants receive an uncertainty threat involving academics,
which is typically a highly accessible goal for undergraduate students. The task was to
read a passage from a graduate-level statistics textbook, which was filled with daunting
mathematical formulas and symbols. This manipulation was used to target
undergraduates’ uncertainty about their own math abilities. The control condition in this
study read a simple introductory passage from an undergraduate statistics textbook. Then,
all participants’ religious zeal was assessed. Participants who received the academic
uncertainty threat reported higher levels of religious zeal than the control group. In fact,
the academic uncertainty group was more likely to support a war that defended their
religious beliefs than the control group (McGregor et al., 2008). These findings suggest
uncertainty could create conflict for a personally relevant goal, such as one’s math
ability, which causes people to strengthen convictions in their religious beliefs to extreme
levels.
McGregor et al.’s (2008) second study observed how uncertainty threat involving
relationships, another highly accessible goal, affected non-Muslim undergraduate
students’ opinions of Islam. Participants were either randomly assigned to a relationship
uncertainty threat group or to a control group. After these tasks, participants rated their
level of agreement with several statements that were either positive or negative
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statements about Islam. Participants who received the relationship uncertainty threat task
reported significantly more negative evaluations of Islam than the control group. This
suggests that when uncertainty creates conflict for personally relevant goals, such as
relationships involving the self, goal-conflict can not only cause people to increase
convictions in their own views, but also belittle views that are unrelated.
McGregor, Nash, Mann, and Phills (2010) also designed a study that tested how
relationship uncertainty threat affected how people approach personal goals. Once again,
the McGregor et al. (2001) relationship uncertainty threat task and control condition were
used. After the induction task, participants completed a personal project approach task.
Participants were asked to select four personal projects that were representative of
themselves. These projects were rated by the participants using questions that applied to
dimensions linked to approach motivation. The study found that participants in the
relationship uncertainty task reported higher approach motivation than the control group.
This suggests that it may be possible to link approaching personally-relevant goals to
uncertainty threat, as uncertainty threat could cause people to become more active and
more likely to engage personal goals.
All of these studies, together, suggest that uncertainty is threatening when it is
about important or active personal goals. This idea recently has received clearer empirical
support, in the form of studies combining goal primes with uncertainty that either does, or
does not, threaten the primed goals (Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2011). Under
conditions where uncertainty is about an active goal, research shows that participants
react defensively, with increased zeal, in a manner consistent with the uncertainty as
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threat perspective. The effects of uncertainty that does not threaten active goals remain to
be seen.
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Importance of Study 2
Thus, it appears that the positioning of uncertainty may not be the only way to
affect people and their abilities to process information and make decisions. It may be the
case that the context in which uncertainty influences people alters decision making
capabilities. Uncertainty that affects an individual’s personally relevant goals may cause
them to process information differently than another individual who experiences
uncertainty that does not affect relevant goals. Uncertainty that creates conflict for a
personally significant goal will likely affect decision making differently than uncertainty
that does not create such conflict.
One effective way to set up personally significant goals is goal priming (Nash, et
al., 2011). Goals can be primed using word searches, scrambled sentence tasks (SST), or
even by providing a prompt with questions that cause participants to think about a
particular goal. Once a goal has been primed, an uncertainty task related to the primed
goal can be completed, which should produce a threat to the primed goal.
In order to test the idea that the context in which uncertainty is induced
determines its impact, two different uncertainty threats were induced after goals were
primed. Participants were exposed to information and asked to give judgments as well as
certainty ratings for their judgments. This study used a modified version of the Wichman
et al. (2008) scrambled sentence task (SST), using words and phrases that primed
achievement and relationship goals. These goal primes were based on content used by
McGregor et al. (2001). The guilt judgment paradigm and DVs that were used in the first
study were also used in the second study.
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In running this study, I primed either relationship or achievement goals, and these
goal primes were followed either by uncertainty inductions that targeted relationships or
achievements. I predicted that when the prime matched the threat (operationalized as
occurring when both the prime and uncertainty threat had to do with either achievement
or relationships) stronger guilt judgments would be produced and participants would
experience less uncertainty in their judgments. In other words, when the prime and threat
matched (achievement prime/threat or relationship prime/threat), participants should
produce stronger guilt judgments and rate lower uncertainty in their judgments than the
other conditions. This prediction followed research from both the uncertainty threat and
uncertainty as goal-conflict research, which has shown that matching uncertainty threat to
active goals produces more extreme responses (Nash et al., 2011). I also predicted that
participants who received conflicting primes and uncertainty threat tasks (achievement
prime/relationship threat and relationship prime/achievement threat conditions) would
produce weaker guilt judgments and more uncertainty in their judgments than the other
conditions. I believe the non-matching conditions, or conditions where the prime and
threat conflict, should create a situation in which participants doubt their thoughts, thus
leading them to seek other information to make their decisions. Control conditions, which
primed participants either with achievement or relationships but had no threat task
attached, were predicted to produce guilt judgments that fell between the matching
conditions and the conflicting conditions.
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Method
Participants
Participants in this study consisted of 121 undergraduate psychology students
attending Western Kentucky University. HSRB approval was obtained for this project,
and informed consent was given by participants (See Appendix H for informed consent
form). Participants either received extra credit of course research credit for participating.
Participants were recruited without regard to their gender, ethnicity, religion, or sexual
orientation. There were 29 male participants and 92 female participants. The mean age
was 19.58 with a standard deviation of 3.06.
Design
This study is considered to be a 2 (goal prime) X 3 (uncertainty threat induction
type) between-subjects factorial design. The two goal primes are achievement and
relationship. The uncertainty threat induction types are achievement-related uncertainty,
relationship-related uncertainty, and no uncertainty threat (control).
Materials
The achievement and relationship goal primes were manipulated using the
scrambled sentence task. The achievement prime consisted of 16 scrambled sentences
and an embedded word was either related to achievement or neutral, based on Wichman
et al. (2008). The same task was given for the relationship prime, only relationshiprelated words were embedded in place of the achievement words. Eight of the 16
sentences for each prime contained an embedded prime-related word or phrase (See
Appendix I for the achievement prime sentences and Appendix J for the relationship
prime sentences).
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The uncertainty threat induction consisted of a prompt that asked participants to
think about a complex achievement/relationship dilemma they felt uncertain about. First,
participants were asked to list the achievement or relationship they were thinking about.
Then, they were asked to describe the uncertainties, problems, and difficulties they were
having while thinking about that particular dilemma previously listed. Participants were
then asked to describe their feelings and thoughts about the uncertainty of the dilemma
continuing to worsen or become more difficult. Each question was presented on separate
screens, and participants were given two minutes on each screen. (See Appendix K for
the achievement and relationships uncertainty threat inductions).
The target information included an athlete stereotype description, based on
Tiedens and Linton’s (2001) research. The information used was the same as the first
study. The target information contained a police statement and personal statement made
by the alleged offender. A mugshot-like image was presented with the personal
statement. A police statement was shown in order to make the information appear to be
official, as well as providing a conflicting view to the student‘s personal statement. A
black-and-white image of college-aged, African-American male was used (See Appendix
C for these materials).
Following the uncertainty induction task and stereotype information were
questions used to measure level of guilt judgments and, more importantly, the level of
uncertainty participants had in the guilt judgments they made, which provided insight
into the degree of uncertainty participants had in their decisions. The guilt judgment
questions asked participants to indicate how guilty the student was, how comfortable
participants would be with the student, etc. After answering all of the guilt judgments
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questions, participants were reminded of each answer they gave and asked, using Likert
scales, how uncertain they were in their assessments. These scores were coded so that
higher scores indicated higher levels of uncertainty for their assessment of guilt for the
target. (Guilt judgment questions can be found in Appendix D).
Procedure
Up to eight participants took part in each experiment session. Participants were
each seated in front of a computer, which explained that the study involved how
personality and previous experiences play a role in how people perceive the world.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 6 different conditions formed by the 2
X 3 design. Demographic information was taken using the computer.
Participants encountered the goal prime task first. Upon completing the priming
task, participants responded to the uncertainty salience task. Then, target information was
presented, followed by the target questions. Participants were given the opportunity to
ask questions about the study after completing the study, and were thanked for their time.
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Study 2 Results and Discussion
Dependent Measures
Initial analyses on target guilt judgments and certainty in judgments did not yield
any significant effects (all p’s > .08). During analyses, though, a particularly unusual
trend was noticed when observing gender. Upon examination, females responded to the
target questions as expected, following my hypotheses and previous literature. However,
males responded in a complete opposite manner than any previous literature I am familiar
with. Table 4 shows the gender differences for a MANOVA that was conducted.
The table indicates that female participants followed the trend hypothesized
earlier, as matching conditions produced stronger guilt judgments toward the target,
conflicting conditions produced weaker guilt judgments, and control conditions fell in
between. However, male participants responded in opposite manner, as they had
matching conditions producing weaker guilt judgments and conflicting conditions
producing stronger guilt judgments.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Gender Differences for Initial MANOVA
Gender
Male

Male

Prime Type
Academic

Relationship

Female

Academic

Female

Relationship

Threat type
Achievement
Relationship
Control
Achievement
Relationship
Control
Achievement
Relationship
Control
Achievement
Relationship
Control
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Mean
4.00
5.00
4.75
5.86
5.00
5.80
5.41
4.27
5.04
3.85
5.00
4.60

Std. Deviation
1.000
2.280
2.630
1.069
1.826
0.837
1.228
1.580
1.459
1.068
1.461
1.639

N
3
6
4
7
4
5
17
15
16
13
16
15

It is possible this occurred by chance, because of the low number of male
participants (n = 29) and correspondingly small cell sizes, or it is possible that this
particular set of male participants has some extraneous variable that affected their
responses. Due to the low number of male participants and no evidence in previous
literature indicating this same finding, male participants were removed from analyses.
This gender finding is further considered in the discussion.
Upon removal of males from analysis, A MANOVA of the target questions
examining prime type and threat type as independent variables observed two significant
findings. A prime type X threat type interaction occurred with the target questions that
asked participants to rate how guilty they believed the target was (F (2, 91) = 5.178,
p = .008, η2 = .107) and how truthful the target was to the police (F (2, 91) = 3.521,
p = .034, η2 = .076). Means and standard deviations can be seen in Table 5.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Interaction using Dependent Variables
Source
Truthful to Police

Guilt of Target

Prime Type Threat Type
Achievement Achievement
Relationship
Control
Relationship Achievement
Relationship
Control
Achievement Achievement
Relationship
Control
Relationship Achievement
Relationship
Control

Mean
3.00
4.20
3.36
4.08
3.38
3.73
5.41
4.27
5.14
3.85
5.00
4.60

Std. Deviation
1.458
1.781
1.237
1.382
1.544
1.387
1.228
1.580
1.459
1.068
1.461
1.639

As predicted, the truthful to police question found that matching conditions
produced a stronger reaction. In other words, participants in the matching conditions
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N
17
15
16
13
16
15
17
15
16
13
16
15

found the target to be less truthful to police than the conflicting conditions, and the
control conditions are in between the other two conditions. My hypotheses were also
supported by the guilt of target question. Matching condition participants gave stronger
guilt judgments than participants in the conflicting conditions, and the control conditions
are in between the other two conditions. These findings are very similar to what
McGregor et al. (2008) and McGregor et al. (2010) found, as both found that active goals
that are threatened produced stronger reactions than less relevant or non-active goals.
Another significant finding and a marginally significant finding were observed
through main effects of prime type. Participants who received the achievement prime
(M = 5.81, SD = 1.142, n = 48) had higher ratings than participants who received the
relationship prime (M = 4.98, SD = 1.745, n = 44) when asked to rate how guilty other
people would find the student to be (F (1, 91) = 6.940, p = .01, η2 = .075). Achievement
prime participants (M = 5.06, SD = 1.493, n = 48) also produced marginally stronger guilt
judgments toward the target (F (1, 91) = 3.491, p = .065, η2 = .039) than relationship
prime participants (M = 4.52, SD = 1.470, n = 44). These findings suggest that when the
participants were primed with a topic that is more self-related, such as achievements, they
give the impression they feel other people are more likely to give a guilty verdict for the
target when compared participants who received the relationship prime, which not only
encompasses the participant, but another individual with a connection to the participant.
It is possible that participants who received the relationship prime might have been
showing sympathy inspired by thinking about others. Previous literature has not actually
compared ratings between different goals such as achievements and relationships, but
instead uses them in separate studies, as both McGregor et al. (2008) and McGregor et al.
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(2010) have been shown to do.
Another MANOVA examining the target questions revealed several significant
findings when analyzing participants’ views on legalization of marijuana. Tables 6 and 7
show the significant results and the means and standard deviations.
Table 6: Effect of Opinion on Marijuana Legalization on Dependent Variables

Source
Legalization
View

Dependent
Variable
Amount of
Community
Service
Comfort of Living
Next Door to
Target
Upset at Marijuana
Usage
Positivity of
Marijuana Usage

SS

df

MS

F

Sig.

η2

12.717

1

12.717

6.010

0.016

0.063

14.052

1

14.052

4.868

0.030

0.051

67.618

1

67.618 18.340 0.001

0.169

26.968

1

26.968

0.066

6.342

0.014

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Marijuana Legalization using Dependent Variables

Dependent Variable
Amount of community service
Comfort of living next to target
Upset at marijuana usage
Positivity toward marijuana usage

Legalization
View
Approve
Oppose
Approve
Oppose
Approve
Oppose
Approve
Oppose

Mean
4.41
5.16
4.32
3.53
2.32
4.07
4.54
3.44

Std.
Deviation
1.739
1.229
1.973
1.489
1.749
2.026
1.966
2.124

N
37
55
37
55
37
55
37
55

Participants who approved of marijuana legalization believed less community
service should be given for possession of marijuana, would be more comfortable living
next to the target in a dorm setting, were less upset about marijuana use on campus, and

31

felt more positive about marijuana use on campus when compared to participants who
opposed marijuana legalization. These findings are logically consistent, as most people
who approve of legalization would be more open to the use of marijuana and to the
people who are suspected to using marijuana.
A paired samples t-test was used in comparing participants’ responses to how
guilty they thought the target (M = 4.80, SD = 1.499) was to how guilty participants
thought other people would find the target (M = 5.41, SD = 1.513). The analysis resulted
in a significant finding (t (91) = 2.880, p = .005, d = .408), which indicates that
participants believed that other people were more likely to find the target guilty than they
themselves did. This could possibly be an outlet for the uncertainty, as what was possibly
when observing gender differences. Participants could have used this dependent variable
as a means of appearing less judgmental by giving lower guilt responses when asked
about their judgments on the target’s guilt. This is a topic that is not discussed in previous
literature, as previous literature has focused primarily on measuring uncertainty and not
comparisons between questions that measure uncertainty.
Certainty Ratings
Another MANOVA was computed examining all of the certainty ratings in this
study, and two particular certainty ratings were found to be significant when comparing
participants’ views on marijuana legalization. Participants who approved in legalizing
marijuana (M = 6.13, SD = 1.165) were more certain of their responses about the power
of evidence against the target (F (1, 91) = 5.172, p = .022, η2 = .081) when compared
participants who oppose legalization (M = 5.50, SD = 1.447). Unfortunately, a post-hoc
Tukey HSD test showed that participants who approved legalization did not have
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significantly more certainty in their responses about the power of evidence against the
target (Mdiff = .630, pTukeyHSD = .101, d = 0.233). Participants who approved legalization
(M = 6.56, SD = .951) were also more certain of their responses than participants who
opposed legalization (M = 6.04, SD = 1.343) when asked about comfort level of living
next to the target in a dorm (F (1, 91) = 6.593, p = .030, η2 = .073). A post-hoc Tukey
HSD test also showed that participants who approved of legalization were marginally
more certain in their level of comfort living next to the target than participants who
opposed legalization (Mdiff = .520, pTukeyHSD = .081, d = 0.218). These certainty ratings
indicate that participants who approve of legalizing marijuana are more certain in their
judgments when the strength of evidence against the target or the comfort of living next
to or near the target comes into question when compared to participants who oppose
legalization. The most reasonable explanation is that participants who approve of
legalizing marijuana will have more personal experience with, and knowledge about,
marijuana, and thus will be more certain in their views of a particular target when that
target is dealing with legal issues involving marijuana.
Limitations of Study 2
Although there was some support for my hypotheses among women, there may be
a couple of explanations as to why my hypotheses for this study were not fully supported.
One explanation is that the information given may not have been powerful or prevailing
enough to induced the desired effects. Before the study ended, participants were asked
what the likelihood of average students and student athletes was to use marijuana.
Participants believed average students (M = 8.90, SD = 1.541) were more likely than
student athletes (M = 7.82, SD = 2.000) to use marijuana, t (91) = 5.054, p = .001,
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d = .605. Although it was unexpected that participants believed average students were
more likely to use marijuana than student athletes, this study suggested that the topic of
marijuana legalization seems potentially to be an effective topic to use in a study of this
type. Marijuana legalization produced significant results, and it is a topic that naturally
partitions people into groups. It may be possible to use uncertainty as a means of altering
people’s opinions on legalization as well as other topics.
The second explanation may come from the gender differences seen above. It
seems that males and females can have different reactions to uncertainty when different
scenarios are involved. It is possible that gender differences could have also played a role
in previous uncertainty studies, but these effects have not systematically been explored in
other studies looking at responses to uncertainty (e.g. McGregor et al., 2008; McGregor
et al., 2010). It is also possible that the sample of males for this study was not typical or
had some extraneous variable that was not accounted for, which may explain the
unexpected results observed for male participants. In either case, gender differences
could be an interesting topic to focus in future research.
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Conclusion
The two studies above investigated both how the positioning of uncertainty and
how uncertainty in the context of goal-conflict affects decision making. Unexpectedly,
Study 1found the before information position participants who received the athlete target
type produced less confidence in their guilt judgment when given the uncertainty threat.
Participants in the after information position group who received the athlete target type
produced more confidence of their guilt judgments when given the uncertainty threat.
However, as expected, participants in the before information position who received the
no athlete condition produced more confidence in their guilt judgment when given the
uncertainty threat. Participants in the after information position group who received the
no athlete target type produced less confidence in their guilt judgment when given
uncertainty threat. This encouraging trend was also seen when participants responded to
how powerful the evidence was against the target. The before information findings are
similar to the McGregor et al. (2001) consensus question, in which participants believed
more people would agree with their opinions after uncertainty threat was induced. The
after information results coincide with Briñol and Petty’s (2003) finding that the
uncertainty induced by nodding one’s head gave less confidence in weak arguments than
did shaking. These findings indicate that the positioning of uncertainty around
information appears to have some effect on how uncertainty influences confidence in
guilt judgments and perceptions of how powerful evidence is.
Study 2 results indicate that males and females respond differently to goalconflict uncertainty. Generally, female participants’ results conformed more closely to
the expected results than did male participants’ results. Female participants who had
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matching prime and threat conditions produced stronger guilt judgments toward the
target, and conflicting prime and threat conditions produced weaker guilt judgments.
Male participants, who had matching prime and threat conditions, produced weaker guilt
judgments, and males with conflicting conditions produced stronger guilt judgments.
An unexpected trend also emerged with prime type. Female participants produced
stronger guilt judgments when primed with achievement and weaker guilt judgments
when primed with relationships. Males gave stronger guilt responses when given the
relationship prime as compared to males who received the achievement prime. Beyond
indicating that more research is needed to understand these gender differences, these
findings suggest that females and males may be more uncertain when primed with
achievement and relationships respectively, which may produce stronger guilt judgments
towards the target. This may have occurred due to the possibility that males are more
achievement-oriented and females are more relationship-oriented, which may have
reduced the uncertainty felt for the goals each gender would oriented towards. This
assumption is similar to Smith and Sinclair (2005), which showed males had higher selfefficacy and higher motivation to approach academic goals than females, and females had
higher motivation to achieve certain emotional goals.
Future research could look at how much stereotyping information is needed to
cause increased stereotyping due to threats, and how much stereotyping information is
needed to cause decreased stereotyping due to meta-cognition. Also, additional research
could be conducted to see if other types of uncertainty manipulations, such as power
(Briñol et al., 2007) or head movements (Briñol & Petty, 2003) find results using this
experimental design.
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If we are able to understand the positioning and the degree of goal conflict effects
of uncertainty and their role in how information is processed, then uncertainty may
become easier to reduce or eliminate in real world settings. Jury members are a prime
example. If jury members feel personally uncertain before information is provided (not
only uncertain about the details of the case), they may overlook details that are available,
and give a quick verdict that unjustly incriminates someone or lets a guilty person go
free. However, if they feel uncertain after information is presented, they may hesitate to
make a decision, taking up more time than needed and could possibly become a hung
jury. If it is possible to find some way to reduce or even eliminate those potential
negative outcomes, it would make life easier and safer for all who make decisions where
uncertainty is involved.
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APPENDIX B
Uncertainty/Watching Television Salience Task


Please describe the emotions that the thought of feeling insecure and
uncertain/watching television arouses in you.



Please jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you
physically as you feel insecure and uncertain/watching television.
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APPENDIX C
Stereotype relevant information
Police Report
On August 31st, 2007, a member of the varsity basketball team was pulled over by the
campus police for a burnt-out rear light. While questioning the individual, the officer
noticed trace amounts of marijuana. The student was detained and issued a citation and
later released. The incident is pending judicial review. The individual has pleaded not
guilty to the incident and claims that the illegal substance must be the property of another
individual and was placed in the vehicle by that other person.
Photo
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Personal Statement
“I was driving my friends home, when a police officer pulled us over. The officer told
me that one of the tail lights was out, and asked to search the car. As the officer
searched, a small bag of marijuana was discovered. I told the officer the marijuana is
not mine, and I do not know who brought it into the car. My friends and I were all
arrested for possession.”
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APPENDIX D
Dependent Variable Measurements
Dependent Variable Measurements all measured on 1-to-7 scales
How powerful do you think the evidence against the student was?
1= not very powerful, 7= very powerful
Based on the feeling you get from this information, does this student seem like a nice
person?
1= not very nice, 7= very nice
Considering the student's statements, how confident does he seem in his innocence?
1= not very confident, 7= very confident
To what degree do you think that the student is being truthful in his statement to the
police?
1= not very truthful, 7= very truthful
How guilty do you think the student is?
1= innocent, 7= guilty
How guilty do you think others would find the student to be?
1=innocent, 7- guilty
Regardless who the marijuana actually belonged to, how much, if any, community
service would be an appropriate punishment for having the marijuana in the car?
1= very little, 7= a great deal
Think back to how guilty you thought the student was. To what extent would you say
you were confident or doubtful in your judgment of the student's guilt?
1=doubtful, 7=confident
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How comfortable would you be living next to this student in a dorm?
1= not very comfortable, 7= very comfortable
Considering the reality that some students at WKU use marijuana, how upset or
disturbed does it make you feel?*
1= very upset, 7= not upset at all
Still considering that some students at WKU use marijuana, how positive do you feel
about this?
1= not positive, 7= very positive
Asterisk indicates item that was reversed scored.
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APPENDIX E
Need for Cognition Scale
Ncog measured on a 1-to-9 scale: 1= very strong disagreement, 9=very strong agreement
I would prefer complex to simple problems.
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
Thinking is not my idea of fun.*
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to
challenge my thinking abilities.*
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think
in depth about something.*
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
I only think as hard as I have to.*
I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.*
I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.*
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.*
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require much thought.
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental
effort.*
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It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.*
I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
Questions with asterisks are reversed scored.
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APPENDIX F
Personal Need for Structure Scale
PNS measured on a 1-to-6 scale: 1=Strongly Disagree, 6=Strongly Agree
It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
I'm not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine.
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.
I enjoy being spontaneous.
I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious.
I don't like situations that are uncertain.
I hate to change my plans at the last minute.
I hate to be with people who are unpredictable.
I find a routine enables me to enjoy life more.
I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations
I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear.
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APPENDIX G
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
RSE is measured on a 1-to-4 scale: 1= Strongly Agree, 4= Strongly Disagree
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
At times I think I am no good at all.
I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
I am able to do things as well as most other people.
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
I certainly feel useless at times.
I feel that I'm a person of worth.
I wish I could have more respect for myself.
All in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure.
I take a positive attitude toward myself.
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APPENDIX H
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APPENDIX I
Achievement Prime Sentences
Achievement SST primes in bold.
He took the container. Noise
His success is clear. Interact
My friend went home. Example
The play was fun. Attain
I washed the car. Transfer
She strives to win. Sidewalk
The room is empty. Baton
They mastered the violin. Speaker
The pen is mine. Rotate
I heard the conversation. Excellence
She’s on a ledge. Surf
His ambitious attitude grows. Stool
The light came on. Envelope
They have switched places. Achievement
I ate a meal. Tomorrow
She has many accomplishments. Index
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APPENDIX J
Relationship Prime Sentences
Relationship SST primes are in bold.
He took the container. Noise
They were both included. Picture
My friend went home. Example
He gave a response. Loved
I washed the car. Transfer
Those two belong together. Plate
The room is empty. Baton
She rested her head. Acceptance
The pen is mine. Rotate
The family is caring. Wrinkle
She’s on a ledge. Surf
The tree grew tall. Supported
The light came on. Envelope
He was well liked. Sink
I ate a meal. Tomorrow
I raked the leaves. Affection
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APPENDIX K
Achievement Uncertainty Prompt
Think about something important you are trying to achieve that is difficult and that you
have uncertainty and doubts about. For example, you may be having trouble staying on
track, or you may be getting some disturbing negative feedback. You are uncertain as to
whether you will be able to accomplish this achievement.
#1) What is this achievement? (For instance, school performance, job search, or excelling
at some task)

#2) Continue to think about the achievement (school achievements, job search, excelling
at some task: that you are uncertain about and is currently not going very well.
Please take 2 minutes to describe the kinds of uncertainties, doubts, problems and
difficulties you are having trying to reach this achievement: The screen will advance
automatically in 2 minutes.

#3) Continue to think about the thing (school achievements, job search, excelling at some
task; that you are uncertain about and is currently not going well.
Please take 2 minutes to describe your thoughts and feelings regarding the possibility of
continuing to have trouble pursuing this achievement, or having additional uncertainty in
reaching this achievement: The screen will advance automatically in 2 minutes.

Relationship Uncertainty Prompt
Think about a close relationship (family member, friend, or romantic partner) that you are
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uncertain about and is currently not going very well. For example, you may be fighting a
lot lately, or not talking as much as you used to. You are uncertain as to whether you will
be able to continue to be as close to this person in the future.
#1) Who is this person? (friend, family member, intimate partner)

#2) Continue to think about the close relationship (family member, friend, or romantic
partner) that you are uncertain about and is currently not going very well.
Please take 2 minutes to describe the kinds of uncertainties, problems and difficulties you
are having with this person: The screen will advance automatically after 2 minutes.

#3) Continue to think about the close relationship (family member, friend, or romantic
partner) that you are uncertain about and is currently not going very well.
Please take 2 minutes to describe your thoughts and feelings regarding the possibility of
this uncertain relationship continuing to go poorly or perhaps even getting worse: The
screen will advance automatically after 2 minutes.
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